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In this long-read Aida A. Hozić critiques the Dayton Peace Agreement and the problems
associated with ethic power-sharing peace agreements where gendered political and
socio-economic policies only serve to strengthen divisions. From Brussels to Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Aida tells us why we must pay attention to the limits of “manly” peace
agreements which neglect gender, and instead continue to work for gendered justice
and peace simultaneously.
November 2020 marked the 25  anniversary of the Dayton Peace Agreement, which
ended the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Negotiated at the Wright-
Patterson Air Base in Dayton, Ohio,  ve years before the adoption of the UN Security
Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security (WPS), the agreement is viewed
as the great diplomatic achievement of the late U.S. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke and
of the Clinton administration.
Despite the fact that widespread violence against women during the Bosnian war, rape
in particular, had led to the much overdue recognition of gender-based violence as a
th
crime against humanity in the international courts of justice, neither women nor gender
were ever considered at Dayton. Indeed, no women – apart from Holbrooke’s wife,
journalist Kati Marton – participated in the negotiations of this agreement.
Both by the composition of key actors at the negotiating table, and by its main features
(recognition of territorial gains acquired through ethnic cleansing and genocide), Dayton
was a quintessential ‘strong men’s’ agreement. Its rami cations still exert costly and
deeply gendered political and socio-economic consequences not just on BiH but on the
broader Southeast European (SEE) neighbourhood. The twin anniversaries of Dayton
and SCR 1325 provide us with an opportunity to re ect upon them in relation to the
broader WPS Agenda.
But let me do something unusual and commence this analysis of Dayton and its legacy
from a different corner of Europe – from Molenbeek, a neighbourhood in Brussels,
pejoratively called Europe’s “Jihad Central” due to its links to a series of terrorist attacks
over the last two decades. In the fall of 2020, Molenbeek was again in the news as the
neighbourhood with the highest per capita number of Covid-19 cases in Belgium, the
country which has itself long held the record for the highest per capita number of Covid-
19 cases in Europe.
I do not start with Molenbeek because of facile links between Europe’s radical Islam
groups and BiH’s large Muslim population – although, perhaps, the persistent
Islamophobia in Europe and in the United States would ask for just such parallels.
Rather, I wish to emphasise the high human costs that institutionalised ethno-religious
divisions exert on people’s lives, made so visible by the pandemic.
In other words, I wish to draw attention to structural similarities between Belgium and
BiH, which contrary to many proponents of power sharing agreements do not bode well
for either of these two countries: indeed, they might have made the deadly tolls of Covid-
19 possible. For both Belgium and BiH are places where institutionalised divisions and
exclusions breed other divisions and exclusions, and where social discontent and
disease can easily get trapped in a neighbourhood and easily stay out of sight. And in
that respect, Belgium and BiH are similar to other power-sharing places such as
Northern Ireland, Cyprus, North Macedonia or Lebanon.
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My key message is this: ethnic power-sharing arrangements are problematic even at the
seat of the EU, and peace agreements based on racialised logic of partition or quasi-
partition and containment generate their own gendered pathologies. In short, post-
Dayton BiH is by no means exceptional in world politics. But BiH deserves a moment of
attention for several additional reasons: because of the “manly” role that the Dayton
Peace Agreement and BiH have played in U.S. diplomatic history and in the memory of
its foreign policy establishment, which is now returning to power in Washington DC;
because of the potential, therefore, for Dayton to be used as a model for other “manly”
peace agreements and for other little BiHs to be replicated and/or sustained elsewhere
(again – consider the fate of similarly segregated political spaces in Northern Ireland,
Cyprus, Lebanon or the inspirational role of Dayton in negotiations of the Ohrid
Framework Agreement in Macedonia and Ahtisaari’s Kosovo Plan); and because of the
lingering, again “manly”, security threats stemming from a con ict that many analysts
would characterise as “frozen” amidst renewed calls for further ethnic partitions, in BiH
but also in (and linked to) Kosovo as the allegedly stabilising solutions for the entire SEE
region.
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Finally, in this moment of increased interest in feminist foreign policy, even in the US,
and of our continued anniversary conversations about the relevance of the WPS Agenda,
I want to emphasise how this gendered – “manly” – logic of the peace agreement has
precluded a realisation of any alternative futures for BiH and SEE. When considering the
future of the WPS Agenda, or reasons why we should continue  ghting for its
implementation, we must not lose sight of the limits that those agreements, which had
paid no attention to gender when they were  rst negotiated, placed on everyone, not just
the women.
Let us interrogate these “manly” reasons and their implications for Bosnia’s – and
perhaps also for the U.S./Europe – future and security by  rst acknowledging that there
is not one, but at least three Daytons that we are talking about. First, there is the Dayton
Peace Agreement now remembered as “one of the great U.S. diplomatic triumphs of the
past generation” and a “historic diplomatic achievement.” This is the Dayton, which, as
Ambassador Christopher Hill said at the 20  Anniversary Dayton Conference, held at
Brown University, was never only about Bosnia itself, but about the future of the
transatlantic relationship, about America’s leadership in the world, and about the
incorporation of the human rights values into the modern state system – and not
necessarily in that particular order.
As Derek Chollet says in his history of the path towards the Dayton Peace Agreement,
“Dayton brought to an end one of the most di cult periods in in the history of U.S.-
European relations.” The agreement did not only end the Bosnian war but “it gave life to
[the] Clinton Administration’s strategy for Europe and that strategy’s core element, NATO
enlargement,” it “blazed important new paths in U.S. – Russian relations,” and it “was a
turning point for the Clinton Administration’s foreign policy speci cally and America’s
role in the world generally.”
This is the Dayton Peace Agreement that also serves as the illustrative example of so-
called “muscular intervention” or “coercive diplomacy” – in other words as the proof that
(U.S.) diplomacy can only work if backed by signi cant force, and vice versa. In addition,
th
Dayton has been an important bonding experience for a number of the U.S. and
European diplomats, the so-called “Bosnian generation.”
Many U.S. politicians, including President Joseph Biden, diplomats and academics have
created affective links with Bosnia and the Balkans, which now serve as formative
experiences for their research/practice and the lens through which they observe other
global con icts. It was Bosnia, which apparently loomed behind the U.S. and the UK’s
decisions to intervene in Libya in 2011 but also behind Western indecision to decisively
aid opposition forces in Syria when President Obama famously said that “former
farmers or pharmacists or teachers” were not hardened enough as  ghters to be
credible and, therefore, worthy of the U.S. support.
Second, there is the Dayton of the Bosnian political elites who have learned how to
contest and accommodate the provisions of the peace agreement and its dysfunctional
institutions through clientelism, nepotism, corruption, blackmail and/or racketeering.
This is the Dayton that continues to produce the same political outcomes, election after
election after election – a gift that keeps on giving, in part because it structurally
disenfranchises a category of people known in Bosnia as “others” (those with no
particular ethnic a liation, minorities such as Jews, Romas, Italians, Slovaks,
Ukrainians, and people with different and/or mixed racial and ethnic backgrounds.
At the already mentioned conference at Brown in 2015, Ambassador Hill – who was
Holbrooke’s deputy at Dayton – spoke about the “real” history of people in Bosnia and
the Balkans and the way that this “real” history was acknowledged at Dayton by
recognising the rights of its three constitutional peoples – Bosniaks (Muslims), Serbs
and Croats. Dayton heeded to their (particularly Serbs’) claims to territory and
established limits to the one-man-one-vote principle.  Most importantly, the issues that
are  traditionally viewed as “feminine” and are particularly acute in post-con ict spaces
– education, health care, invisible and informal labour, family care work, reparations for
war-time violence – have never been seriously considered, especially in relation to
justice, and continue to be trumped by security and stability concerns.
Third, there is the Dayton lived on a daily bases by BiH citizens – a country where babies
die because of ethni ed bureaucracies, where train tracks exist but trains no longer
travel anywhere, where building some 60 km of highway has taken nearly 20 years,
where the key cultural institutions (including the National Museum in Sarajevo) were
shut down for years. This is the country, where – as Azra Hromadzic has written so
wonderfully – restrooms are about the only public places where the youth from different
ethnic backgrounds can meet and date; where children embody ethnic differences that
were violently inscribed on their parents’ bodies, and where ethnic miscegenation is now
very rarely practiced. This is also the country – currently the chief concern of European
diplomats – of mass exodus, particularly among the young and well-educated (medical
personnel and nurses especially), which has made health care amidst the Covid-19
pandemic so much more di cult.
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The  rst two Daytons – the one etched in the memory of Western diplomats and the one
performed by BiH political elites – co-exist quite well with each other. Their common
interest is in maintaining the political status quo and exclusion of all other actors who
could threaten their positions in power. Their achievement, and the standard of
political/democratic practice, is that “people are no longer killing each other.” Hence,
when people, those “others” unrecognised by the Dayton Peace Agreement, happen to
rise and demand more than “not killing” from their political representatives, as was the
case during the Bosnian spring of protests in 2014, the EU and the U.S. response is to
increase funding and training for Bosnia’s surveillance programmes and anti-riot police.
At the 20  anniversary conference in Dayton, former U.S. Ambassador to Bosnia
Thomas Miller asked Jonathan Moore, then U.S. Ambassador to the OSCE mission in
BiH, how would he brief an incoming U.S. President about BiH’s political prospects.
th
Ambassador Moore, whose portfolio combined education and counter-terrorism,
promptly responded: “The U.S. has limited resources. Bosnia is  ne. I would recommend
doing nothing.” These days, Gerald Knaus, founding chairman of the in uential think-tank
European Stability Initiative and (an occasional) advisor to the German Chancellor
Angela Merkel, similarly maintains that BiH is  ne, especially in comparison to other
partitioned places, such as Cyprus, Northern Ireland or Nagorno Karabakh.
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Thus, instead of being mindful – if not outright ashamed – of these painful, spatially
inscribed divisions on the European periphery (consider, for example, that the rate of
suicides in Belfast since the Good Friday Agreement – mostly by men suffering from
PTSD in the aftermath of the violent con ict  – now exceeds the number of victims
during the Troubles), Western diplomats view these spaces as problems well-solved.
And that, obviously, begs the question: if Bosnia is  ne, according to Moore and Knaus,
for whom is it not  ne? Whose concerns are being heard in international fora and whose
continue to be neglected?
For, in the meantime, the third Dayton, largely ignored by both domestic and international
elites, festers in the background. Bosnia and Herzegovina shares the unenviable honour
with Kosovo of having the highest level of youth unemployment in the world (albeit
alleviated lately by demographic trends and migration to the EU). One would expect that
someone in Washington or in Brussels would at least wonder how is it that these two
countries, which were placed under international supervision and received billions of
dollars in aid, have such poor economic performance? Where did we go wrong? Where
did all that money go?
Some believe that Biden’s Presidency raises hopes of renewed U.S. interest in BiH,
obviously assuming that Biden would not be all too busy attending to the U.S. itself. But
the hope has another dangerous implication: it illustrates the degree to which
clientelism in relation to great powers dominates political thinking and political practice
in the entire region. In addition, and to make these geopolitical matters even more
complicated, not only does Russia continue to treat ambiguous spaces like Republika
Srpska, Northern Kosovo and even southern Serbia as its playgrounds, Berlin is currently
signalling that it might unilaterally replace the current international supervisor in Bosnia,
Valentin Inzko, with a CSU loyal Christian Schmidt. The rift in EU-US relations over BiH
may be just a trial balloon for a more “muscular” German and European People’s Party
policy within and beyond the EU.
In contrast to these “manly” affairs, gender issues and “feminine” socio-economic
problems continue to receive very little attention, even in the numerous “Dayton 25”
conferences. There is, of course, continued lip-service being paid to “women’s
empowerment,” but it never goes beyond requests for more (individual) women’s
representation in politics.
National Action Plans for WPS in BiH, as elsewhere, focus mostly on issues of women’s
participation in high-level decision-making positions such as in the security forces and
peacekeeping missions. As Bjorkdähl and Selimovic have already argued, based on their
close analysis of NAPs in BiH and Rwanda, “the construction of participation is linked to
the constitution of women as passive rather than active, and follows a conventional
approach of ‘add women and stir.’ Women are added but the institutions, discourses and
practices are not changed.” Without additional funding for socio-economic
empowerment, and inserted into existing ethnic power-sharing arrangements, the WPS
Agenda loses its transformative potential. Not surprisingly, individual women politicians
in the SEE region have proven to be excellent ethno-nationalists themselves: scant in
numbers but powerful in image creation, they faithfully execute and placate the “manly”
twin agendas of militarised security and privatised, extractivist economics.
Analyses of these successful gender entrepreneurs would lend further evidence to Marie
Berry’s and Milli Lake’s inconvenient  ndings that efforts at women’s inclusion may often
mask other forms of exclusionary politics. Their participation only obscures the degree
to which entrenched ethno-nationalist interests render other women and identities
invisible and other ways of envisioning politics impossible. In BiH, as in the U.S., focus
on elite diversity only proves that feminist understandings of the world cannot be
reduced to identity politics based on representation only.
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And that brings us back to Molenbeek, the Brussels neighbourhood with the highest rate
of unemployment in Belgium (three times the national average) where social problems
and injustices have been ignored for too long, hidden from view by the wealth of
surrounding areas and by the large numbers of Eurocrats and internationals working in
the European capital.
The links between Molenbeek and former Yugoslavia – through arms and people
tra cking – have already been documented. The pandemic reveals how important all
other “feminine” aspects of security are – access to health care, availability of medical
personnel, economic safety nets, childcare and child-schooling, gender equality in
households and in public.
By thinking about the pandemic toll in Belgium and BiH not just in proximity to each
other, but on a continuum of gendered circuits of violence and (re)distributions of harm
and comfort, we are forced to reconceptualise the notions of war and peace, con ict
and post-con ict.
The tension between pragmatism and feminist understandings of security is not easily
resolved through the WPS Agenda, even less so in its implementation, but it constitutes
an opening for different readings of politics and alternative visions of future. While
taking WPS seriously does not melt away “manly” concerns over geopolitics, it allows us
to think about gendered justice and peace simultaneously in the heart of Europe and on
its periphery, in the United States and in Germany, as much as in wounded places, such
as Bosnia and Herzegovina. By doing so, it could ensure that the doses of the peace
medicine are administered more equitably, with consideration and self-re ection, not
only to presumed patients but to doctors as well.
The views, thoughts and opinions expressed in this blog post are those of the
author(s) only, and do not re ect LSE’s or those of the LSE Centre for Women, Peace and
Security.
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